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OPEN ADOPTION, INHERITANCE, AND THE
"UNCLEING" PRINCIPLE
E. Gary Spitko*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article critiques current inheritance law relating to
adopted children in light of the purposes of modern adoption
law and the increasing prevalence of open adoptions.1 In
general, the current law governing inheritance rights arising
from adoption derives from a substitution principle, which
seeks to treat an adopted child for all purposes, including
with respect to inheritance rights, as having been born into
her adoptive family.2 This substitution principle, however,
does not fit comfortably within an open adoption paradigm in
which a birth parent has entered into an open adoption
agreement with the adoptive parents and has maintained a
relationship with the child subsequent to the adoption.
Indeed, this substitution principle might disserve all
members of the adoption triad-the adopted child, the
*Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. A.B., Cornell
University; J.D., Duke University School of Law. I am grateful to Pat Cain,
June Carbone, Mary Louise Fellows, Larry Waggoner, and participants in the
Santa Clara Law Review's 2008 Symposium for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this article, and to Bill Logan and Spencer Chen for their
research assistance with respect to this article.
1. For a comprehensive report on the present state of infant adoption in
the United States, an examination of "the body of research on the long-term
social-psychological consequences of adoption for birthparents," and a set of
recommendations for reform of adoption law and practices, see SUSAN
LIVINGSTON SMITH, EvAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., SAFEGUARDING THE
RIGHTS AND WELL BEING OF BIRTH PARENTS IN THE ADOPTION PROCESS (2007),
available at
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/publications/2006 11 BirthparentStudy-Ml.
pdf. This report concludes that "[ciurrent adoption-related statutes are too often
based on outdated understandings, faulty stereotypes, and misinformation from
the time that secrecy pervaded the adoption world." Id. at 12.
2. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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adoptive parents, and the birth parents-involved in an open
adoption by failing to recognize and respect the differences
between the family formed by open adoption and the family
based on blood. Families by adoption generally face
challenges with respect to identity and separation that
families by blood do not.4 Most notably, an adopted child
might suffer feelings of loss and abandonment relating to the
adoption5 and might feel a psychological need to know and
connect with her birth family.' Also, an adoptive parent
might feel insecure in her identity as the adoptive child's
parent in light of the birth parent's competing claim to that
identity.7 Such insecurities may exist even if the birth parent
3. As Professor Naomi Cahn has commented:
Even as adoption law has moved toward erasing differences between
adopted children and blood children, this belies the reality that
adoptive families do face different challenges. Moreover, the attempt to
erase differences may, paradoxically, contribute to the stigma of
adoption: there is something less satisfactory, or even shameful, about
adoption, such that adoptive families must conform to the norm
established by blood families. Adoptive families confront very different
issues from biologically based families, and erasing those different
issues by assuming complete comparability prevents all members of the
adoption triad from creatively confronting these differences.
Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1165
(2003).
4. See, e.g., Annette Baran and Reuben Pannor, Perspectives on Open
Adoption, in 3 ADOPTION 119 (1993) (reviewing the negative effects of
anonymity in adoption on the birth parents, the adoptee, and the adoptive
parents).
5. See id. at 122 ("[1It is our belief, based on years of work with adoptees of
all ages, that some of them are particularly vulnerable because of feelings of
loss and abandonment, exacerbated by the secrecy and anonymity of closed
adoptions.").
6. See id. at 120 (describing how an adoptee's lack of knowledge of her
personal history may lead to "fantasies and distortions" and how certain major
events in the adoptee's life, such as her marriage or the birth of a child, may
"create an urgent desire for specific background information, particularly about
family history").
7. See generally JUDITH S. MODELL, KINSHIP WITH STRANGERS: ADOPTION
AND INTERPRETATION OF KINSHIP IN AMERICAN CULTURE 226 (1994) ("A paper
parenthood cannot compare with the 'physical realities' of conception, creation,
gestation, and birth, not in American culture anyway."); Baran & Pannor, supra
note 4. Of relevance also is the proposition that:
[Aldoption and assisted reproduction are not equally valued, given the
nearly overwhelming desire for and bias in favor of genetically-related
children. Thus, the possibility of a genetic tie to a child born through
assisted reproduction may make that choice appear more
understandable and legitimate in a society that extols consanguineous
relationships and regards nonconsanguineous relationships with
suspicion, if not derision.
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has not maintained a relationship with the adopted child and
even if the adoptive family does not know the birth parent's
identity.' Finally, a birth parent might suffer chronic feelings
of loss, regret, or shame relating to her decision to place her
child for adoption.9  By ignoring these complex human
emotions, inheritance law risks compounding the challenges
arising from adoption that all members of the adoption triad
face. Thus, inheritance law would better serve the interests
of family members involved in an open adoption by
recognizing the ways that adoptive families differ from blood
families and also by recognizing the important differences
between families arising from an open adoption as contrasted
with families arising from a closed adoption.
This article, therefore, proposes a reform of the law
governing inheritance rights arising from an open adoption to
better serve the interests of all members of the adoption
triad. Specifically, the article proposes reforming intestacy
statutes to allow an adopted child and her birth parent who
have maintained a "qualifying functional relationship"
following an open adoption to inherit from and through each
other as would an aunt or uncle and a niece or nephew. Thus,
the proposed reform would treat the birth parent and
adopted-out child as potential heirs of each other, but would
Richard F. Storrow, Marginalizing Adoption Through the Regulation of Assisted
Reproduction, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 479, 483 (2006); see also id. at 490 (attributing
the stigmatization of adoption under Islam in part to a "belief that the only way
for a parent to feel full parental instincts and devotion to a child is through a
genetic connection to that child").
8. See Baran & Pannor, supra note 4, at 120-21 ("The ghosts of the
birthparents, inherent in the closed system, are ever present, and may lead to
the fear that these parents will reclaim the child and that the child will love
these parents more than the adoptive parents.").
9. Id. at 120 ("Relinquishment of a newborn child may be profoundly
damaging to birthparents and cause lifelong pain and suffering. Even when
relinquishment is a carefully considered and chosen option, birthmothers-and
often birthfathers-may suffer from a heightened sense of worthlessness after
giving away a child."). See also Smith, supra note 1, at 5 ("Research on
birthparents in the era of confidential (closed) adoptions suggests a significant
proportion struggled - and sometimes continue to struggle - with chronic,
unresolved grief. The primary factor bringing peace of mind is knowledge about
their children's well-being."). Smith is careful to note that "the research on
long-term outcomes of birthmothers is rife with methodological problems" such
as the use of clinical or self-selected samples and retrospective surveys, the
limited utilization of comparison groups or standardized measures, and the
failure to examine outcomes by cohort or adoption practices experienced. See id.
at 46.
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also increase the distance between them on the family tree.
The proposed reform also would extend this "uncleing"
principle"° to more distant biological relations of the adopted
child by similarly moving the biological relations further
away from the child on the family tree. Specifically, the
uncleing principle would add one "line of inheritance" and two
"degrees of kinship" to the line of inheritance and degree of
kinship otherwise existing based on biology." Thus, for
example, when the qualifying functional relationship exists
between biological parent and adopted child, the intestacy
scheme would treat an adopted child's birth aunt or uncle (a
second-line, third-degree biological relation) as a first cousin
once removed (a third-line, fifth-degree relation).
My proposed reform has as a grounding principle that
inheritance law should not, under any circumstances, treat as
a parent of a child one who has not actually parented that
child. 2 Biology alone does not make one a parent and the law
should not imply that it does." In all instances, therefore, my
proposed reform would treat a biological parent who has not
raised her child as less than a legal parent for purposes of
inheritance. At the same time, my proposed reform seeks to
acknowledge the psychological importance of the biological
10. I use the term "uncleing" principle rather than "aunting" principle for
the sake of euphony.
11. For a discussion of intestate taking by collateral relatives, including the
parentelic (line of inheritance) and degree-of-kinship systems, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.4
cmts. a-l (1998); see also JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 78-80 (7th ed. 2005). I explain the calculation of a "line of inheritance"
and a "degree of kinship" infra, notes 81-85 and accompanying text, in the
context of discussing more filly inheritance through a birth parent or adopted-
out child under the uncleing principle.
12. Cf. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(c) (amended 1993) (allowing
inheritance from or through a child by either natural parent or his or her
kindred only if the natural parent has openly treated the child as his or hers
and has not refused to support the child); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6452 (West Supp.
2008) (allowing a natural parent or relative of that natural parent to inherit
from or through a child born out of wedlock on the basis of the parent and child
relationship alone only if the natural parent or relative of the natural parent
"acknowledged the child" and the natural parent or relative of the natural
parent "contributed to the support or the care of the child").
13. See E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity:
Evidence of the Biological Mother's Consent to the Biological Father's Co-
Parenting of Her Child, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 97, 100 (2006) (arguing that
constitutional protection for parental rights arises in part from the
"performance of parental labor that is sustained and has a positive and
profound impact on the development of the child").
[Vo1:48
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connection for both adopted children and their birth families.
Thus, my proposed reform would treat an adopted child and
her biological family as potential heirs of one another when
the biological connection has been augmented by a qualifying
functional relationship subsequent to the open adoption.
I would expect that my proposed reform, at a surface
level, would impact relatively few people. Consider that, for
example, under the proposed reform, an adopted child would
be an heir of her biological parent only if that biological
parent entered into an open adoption agreement with respect
to the child, maintained a qualifying functional relationship
with the child, died intestate, and was not survived by any
spouse, legally-recognized living descendant, parent, or
sibling. But I think that the value of the proposed reform
should not be measured only in terms of the relative number
of people who would actually take under it or the relative
amount of wealth that would actually be affected by it.
Indeed, the proposed reform would better serve the
interests and needs of adopted children, their adoptive
families, and their birth families even in cases in which no
one involved in a particular adoption ever inherits under the
proposed reform. The value added relates to the notion that
inheritance law in general, and the intestacy statute in
particular, is rivaled only by blood and marriage as a means
by which we as a society define who is "family."14 Thus, when
a testator writes a will, she is able to define for herself with
precision who she views as her family. Indeed, disinheritance
wounds the disinherited heir not only because of the
consequent financial loss, but also because of the disinherited
heir's realization that the testator has removed her from her
family.1"
14. See Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship Under Intestacy
Statutes, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 643 (2002). Gary asserts that the "definitions of
'family' imbedded in intestacy statutes send a message about who counts as a
family member and whose families count." Id. at 645. Gary further explains
that intestacy statutes give "emotional support to family members simply by
identifying them as persons entitled to a distribution from the decedent's
estate." Id. at 652. For a contrary proposition, see Adam J. Hirsch, Default
Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1031, 1054 (2004) (opining that "the expressive ramifications of intestacy
law appear alternately negligible and irrelevant, and the conclusion follows that
they should not influence the formulation of rules of intestacy or other
inheritance defaults in (virtually) any respect").
15. See Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using Mediation to
2008] 769
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The proposed reform would serve the interests of
adoptive families by not defining genetic parents as the
adopted child's actual parents. In that way, the proposed
reform avoids devaluing the actual parental labor that
adoptive parents perform. 16 The proposed reform would serve
the interests of birth families and adopted children by
defining them as potential heirs with respect to each other,
and thereby recognizing the psychological importance of the
biological connection between them when the biological
connection is accompanied by a meaningful social
relationship.
II. INHERITANCE AND MODELS OF ADOPTION
Early American adoption statutes varied with respect to
their treatment of the inheritance rights of adopted children
and their birth and adoptive families. 7 While some of these
statutes expressly treated adopted children as similar to
biological or "natural" children for the purposes of
inheritance," other statutes expressly treated adopted
children quite differently from biological children with respect
to inheritance. 9 Professor Naomi Cahn summarizes the
Resolve Probate Disputes over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 397, 415-23 (1997) (discussing the emotional significance that family
members and will contestants attach to inheritance).
16. Cf. Cahn, supra note 3, at 1081 (noting the challenge of determining
"how to expand the meaning of family without destabilizing families").
17. See generally id. at 1126-39 (summarizing the evolution of American
adoption law with respect to inheritance rights); see also Keegan v. Geraghty,
101 Ill. 26, 33 (1881) (noting that a majority of states had enacted adoption
statutes, that "[tihere is not uniformity in such statutes," and "[iun no two of
them, perhaps, are the new rights and obligations precisely the same"). For a
brief history of the evolving purposes and structure of American adoption law,
see Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of
Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1956); see also Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood,
Adoption and Association: Who Should Get What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV.
711, 714-17 (1984).
18. But cf Cahn, supra note 3, at 1132 ("[Njo [early American adoption]
statute accorded adoptive children the same intestacy rights as biological
children.").
19. See id. at 1128; see also Elizabeth J. Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An
Inquiry Into the History of Adult Adoptee Access to Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS
L. REV. 367, 395-96 (2001) (surveying legal periodicals from the 1920s through
the 1960s and concluding that "[blefore 1935, adopted children were permitted
to inherit from their adoptive parents, although they were generally unable to
inherit from relatives of the adoptive parents. Adopted children were usually
permitted to inherit from their birth parents as well as from other birth
relatives.").
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distinctions made by early adoption statutes as follows:
First, some statutes explicitly specified differences
between the rights of adopted children and biological
children to inherit from their [adoptive] parents. Second,
historically, under the 'stranger-to-the-adoption' rule, an
adopted child generally could not inherit from relatives
who were not a party to the adoption. Third, adoptive
children could continue to inherit from their biological
relatives in some states, and their biological relatives
could inherit from them even after the adoption. Finally,
even outside the general laws of intestacy and wills, the
adoption statutes allowed the adoption agreement to
determine the adoptee's rights.2"
Professor Cahn also notes that the cases interpreting
these early adoption statutes were inconsistent. "In some
cases, judges interpreted the adoption statutes broadly, and
in others, narrowly, using the same general legal principles
and applying them to similar facts."21  The maxim that "God
alone makes the heir, not man" informed the narrow
approach.22 The norm, which still has some currency today,
was that inheritance rights "naturally" derive from blood ties;
therefore, only a clear statutory mandate or a valid
testamentary instrument could impair such inheritance
rights. Related to this norm is the belief that a decedent
20. Cahn, supra note 3, at 1128; see also id. at 1128-32 (discussing
particular statutory provisions from various states illustrating these
generalizations); id. at 1127 (noting that some early adoption statutes that
allowed the adopted child to inherit as an heir of the adoptive parents
nevertheless did not allow the adoptive parents to inherit from the adopted
child).
21. Id. at 1126.
22. See Rein, supra note 17, at 713.
23. See id. at 713, 722; see also Cahn, supra note 3, at 1127 ("In applying
the adoption statutes in the context of the common-law doctrine of blood-based
inheritance, courts were chary of granting non-blood related children significant
intestacy interests, and thus scrutinized carefully the claims of adoptive
children, lest they usurp 'legitimate' children."); Upson v. Noble, 35 Ohio St.
655, 658 (1880) ("This [adoption] statute, in so far as it changes the general
course of descents and distribution of intestate property, and ignores all merit
on account of blood, should be strictly construed."); Keegan v. Geraghty, 101 Ill.
26, 39 (1881) ("As against the adopted child the statute should be strictly
construed, because it is in derogation of the general law of inheritance, which is
founded on natural relationship, and is a rule of succession according to nature,
which has prevailed from time immemorial."); Ex parte Clark, 25 P. 967, 968
(Cal. 1891) (commenting that rights arising from adoption are "purely
statutory," that transfer of "natural rights" from the birth parents is "repugnant
to the principles of the common law" and that "all doubts in controversies
20081 771
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"naturally" would want her property to pass to her blood
relations to the exclusion of non-blood relations.24 As the
Illinois Supreme Court reasoned in 1881 in adjudicating a
probate dispute,
[t]o have [the property of a decedent who was not the
adoptive parent but was the natural child of the adoptive
parent] turned away upon his death from blood relations,
where it would be the natural desire to have property go,
and pass into the hands of an alien in blood[, her adoptive
half-sister],-to produce such effect, it seems to us, the
language of the statute should be most clear and
unmistakable .... 25
In contrast, modern adoption and inheritance statutes
generally treat the adopted child as a full-fledged member of
the adoptive family and a stranger to the biological family for
purposes of inheritance.26 This approach purports to further
between the natural and the adopting parents should be resolved in favor of the
former"); Sarazin v. Union R.R. Co., 55 S.W. 92, 94 (Mo. 1900) ("Adoption is in
derogation of the common law, and purely of statutory enactment, and, like all
other similar statutes, must be strictly complied with.").
24. See Cahn, supra note 3, at 1128 ("The assumption underlying the
disinheritance of adopted children was, obviously, that decedents wanted their
estates to go to blood relatives."); see also Helms v. Elliott, 14 S.W. 930, 931
(Tenn. 1890) (holding that "[a]s to the estates of other persons than the
adopting parent, the law of adoption fixes no rights in the adopted child" and
distinguishing case law holding that statute of legitimation conferred greater
inheritance rights on legitimated children on the ground that "the bastard has
the blood of his parents").
25. Keegan, 101 Ill. at 39.
26. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.5(2) (1998) ("An adopted individual is a child of his or her
adoptive parent or parents [and ... ijf the adoption removes the child from the
families of both of the genetic parents, the child is not a child of either genetic
parent."); id. at cmt. d ("An adopted child is treated as a child of his or her
adoptive parent or parents. Most intestacy statutes ... treat an adopted child
as a full-fledged member of the child's adoptive family."); CAL. PROB. CODE §
6450(b) (West Supp. 2008) ("The relationship of parent and child exists between
an adopted person and the person's adopting parent or parents."); CAL. PROB.
CODE § 6451(a) ("An adoption severs the relationship of parent and child
between an adopted person and a natural parent of the adopted person.. ..");
The express provisions of [the Georgia statute providing for the effect of
an adoption decree] make plain that the legislature intended that
following adoption there be a complete substitution of families for the
adopted individual. Consequently, in the case of adoption by unrelated
persons, there is a termination of the adopted individual's legal ties
with his natural parents, not only for the purposes of intestate
succession but also with regard to the passing of property by virtue of
written instruments, including wills and trusts.
Miller v. Walker, 514 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Ga. 1999); Estate of Best, 485 N.E.2d 1010,
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donative intent in the run of cases. For example, the decision
to derive an intestacy statute from such a "substitution"
principle likely reflects in part the belief that in a typical
adoption, the adoptive family members are likely to come to
accept each other as their next of kin while, in contrast, the
birth family and the adoptive child are not likely to view each
other as next of kin.27
More generally, an important rationale grounding this
"substitution" approach is that adoption should give the
adopted child a "fresh start" with a substitute family and,
accordingly, the law should treat the child as though he had
been born into the adoptive family.28 Moreover, severing all
ties with the biological family, the thinking goes, furthers the
adopted child's assimilation into his substitute family.29
1012 (N.Y. 1985) (construing class gift to exclude child adopted out of donor's
family and reasoning that "[uin detailing adoption procedures (citation omitted)
the Legislature clearly intended that the adopted child be severed from the
biological family tree and be engrafted upon new parentage."); see generally 3
ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICE §§ 12-B.01-.02 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2007)
(discussing the construction of class gifts in testamentary instruments in
relation to the inclusion or exclusion of adopted persons). There are exceptions.
See, e.g.,:
An adopted individual is the child of his [or her] adopting parents and
not of his [or her] natural parents, but adoption of a child by the spouse
of either natural parent has no effect on (i) the relationship between
the child and that natural parent or (ii) the right of the child or a
descendant of the child to inherit from or through the other natural
parent.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b) (1990); see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 6451 (West
Supp. 2008) (providing for exceptions relating to adoption by a stepparent or
after the death of a natural parent); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1218(B) (2004)
("The right of the child to inherit from his parents and other blood relatives is
unaffected by the adoption."); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 40 (Vernon 2006 & Supp.
2007-2008) (with certain exceptions, the adopted "child shall inherit from and
through its natural parent or parents").
27. My proposed reform of intestacy statutes implementing the uncleing
principle in certain cases of open adoption also is grounded in part on the
presumed donative intent of the adopted-out child and members of the birth
family. Infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. I have been unable, however,
to locate any empirical study that speaks directly to the question of the donative
intent of birth parents or adopted-out children in such cases of open adoption.
28. See Rein, supra note 17, at 713, 717, 721; see also Harvey Uhlenhopp,
Adoption in Iowa, 40 IOWA L. REV. 228, 285 (1955).
29. See Rein, supra note 17, at 717 (arguing that "it is apparent that an
adoptee's retention of ties with his biological family can undermine the
psychological aspect of this assimilation" into the adoptive family); see also id.
at 729 ("The child's bonding with his adoptive family is disturbed if the child's
biological relatives interfere with the new family."); Patricia G. Roberts,
Adopted and Nonmarital Children - Exploring the 1990 Uniform Probate Code's
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Thus, the modern approach to inheritance rights arising from
adoption is consistent with, and indeed derives from, what
Professor Joan Hollinger describes as the "asserted-
equivalence model" of adoption that grounds a closed
adoption paradigm:
[B]iogeneticism and the parental rights doctrine embody
an ideal to which many adoptive families aspire. This
aspiration is most evident in the traditional assertion that
adoptive families are a 'complete substitute' for, and
function 'as if they are, biogenetically-based families and
are entitled to the same cultural acceptance and legal
protection. For much of the 20 t century, the asserted-
equivalence model of adoption attempted to reinscribe the
biogenetic family by creating a legal framework within
which the personal and emotional ties of the 'natural'
family were to be replicated. The goal was - and for many
adoptive parents still is - to look and feel as close as
possible to what they can never really have. State laws
that seal adoption records, substitute the names of
adoptive parents for birth parents on 'certificates of live
birth,' and permit, even if they do not require, anonymity
and strict separation between birth and adoptive families
are fully consistent with the asserted-equivalence model.3 °
The asserted-equivalence model, however, has come
under sustained attack for more than a quarter century.3
Intestacy and Class Gift Provisions, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 539, 543
(1998) (asserting that the rationale of the "fresh start" policy is that "it is in the
child's best interests to sever emotional and financial ties with the biological
family to facilitate the creation of new ties with the adoptive family"); Annette
Ruth Appell, The Move Toward Legally Sanctioned Cooperative Adoption: Can it
Survive the Uniform Adoption Act?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 483, 490 (recognizing that
proponents of the "exclusive model" argue that "banishment of the birth parents
is necessary for the child to develop exclusive loyalties and obedience to the
adoptive family so that the child's value system and cognitive development can
proceed unhindered by interference or threats from outside forces").
30. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Authenticity and Identity in Contemporary
Adoptive Families, 3 J. GENDER SPECIFIC MED. 23, 24 (2000). Rein, supra note
17, adds further that "[tihe very purpose of state regulations requiring sealed
adoption records is to protect the adoptive family from post adoption disruption,
thereby strengthening the new family unit and promoting the adoptee's
assimilation into it." Id. at 724. An additional purpose of state laws sealing
adoption records was to protect the adoptive child and the birth parent from the
supposed shame of a non-marital birth. See Janine Baer, The Basic Bastard, in
FAMILIES BY LAw 146 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger eds., 2004); see
also In re Christine, 397 A.2d 511, 513 (R.I. 1979) (confidentiality surrounding
adoption "protects the adoptee from any possible stain of illegitimacy").
31. Hollinger, Authenticity and Identity, supra note 30, at 23.
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Critics argue that the approach "trivializ[es] the
psychological, social, and indeed, biogenetic differences
between 'natural' and adoptive families."32 Because of its
emphasis on the equivalence of biogenetic families and
adoptive families, critics argue, the model is ill-suited to
address the challenges that all members of the adoption triad
face arising from these profound psychological, social, and
biogenetic differences.3 3  Indeed, the asserted-equivalence
model may exacerbate these challenges.
An alternative and ascendant model for adoption
emphasizes openness and acceptance of the reality that
adoptive families differ in meaningful ways from biogenetic
families. 34 For ease of discussion, I shall refer to this way of
thinking as the "differences approach." This differences
approach provides a theoretical framework that supports the
increasing acceptance and prevalence of open adoptions.
The term open adoption refers to arrangements that
range from, at the one end, a limited exchange of information
between birth parents and adoptive parents at the time of
adoption to, at the other end, an enduring arrangement that
facilitates exchanges of letters or visits among the birth
parents and the child that they placed for adoption. 5 In
recent years, the number of open adoptions as a total
percentage of all infant adoptions has increased
significantly. 6
32. Id.
33. See id. ("These differences are now said by many adoptees and birth
parents, as well as by ever larger numbers of adoptive parents, to be of profound
importance, and, if denied, continue to fester and threaten the well-being of all
members of the adoption triad .... The denial of differences is no longer in
vogue.").
34. See id. at 24, 24-25 ("'Openness' and the acknowledgment and
acceptance of difference are rapidly becoming the mantras of contemporary
adoption practice. Adoptive families continue to seek cultural acceptance and
legal protection ... doing so by applauding their distinctive characteristics and
not portraying themselves as mirror images of the biogenetic families .... ).
35. Id.; see also Baran & Pannor, supra note 4, at 121 ("An open adoption is
one in which the birthparent(s) at least meet the adoptive parents and may
even participate in selecting them.... [Olpen adoption includes the exchange of
identifying information and the making of agreements regarding future contact
and communication.").
36. See Smith, supra note 1, at 19 (reviewing several studies and California
Department of Social Services data and concluding that "it appears few totally
closed adoptions take place in this country today, [and although] we do not
know how many infant adoptions involve ongoing direct contact [between a
birth parent and adopted-out child], [tihe preponderance of evidence indicates
20081 775
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This trend toward a greater prevalence of open adoptions
in part reflects the increased bargaining power that today's
birth parents (typically birth mothers) wield in the adoption
transaction. The increased availability and usage of birth
control, the access to legal abortion, and the lessening of any
stigma attached to out-of-wedlock birth have resulted in a
greater shortage of healthy infants (particularly healthy
white infants) available for adoption.3 8 A birth mother today,
this is a minority of infant adoptions, but is steadily increasing"); id. at 6
(describing the trend since the 1970s "toward more openness in infant
adoptions" and noting that presently approximately ninety percent of
prospective birthmothers choose and meet the adoptive parents of their
children); see also Susan M. Henney et al., The Impact of Openness on Adoption
Agency Practices: A Longitudinal Perspective, 6 ADOPTION Q. 31, 38 (2003)
(reporting the authors' longitudinal study finding that the percentage of
adoption agencies offering fully-disclosed adoptions grew from thirty-six percent
in 1987-1989 to seventy-nine percent in 1999 and concluding that during the
period of the study "the range of openness options offered by these agencies has
moved steadily toward greater openness"); Appell, supra note 29, at 489 (noting
that "open adoption is becoming standard procedure" and suggesting reasons for
this change); Sonia Nazario, Between Two Families: A Pioneer in an Experiment
Called Open Adoption; Kendall's Journey Illustrates the Struggle of Children
Who Bond Both with Their Birth Families and Those Who Adopt Them, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007 (reporting that "[aldoption agencies estimate that 90% of
infant adoptions in the United States are open enough for adoptive and birth
parents to meet at least once -- and a quarter are completely open" and
contrasting this present state with "[florty years ago [when] closed adoptions
were the rule").
37. See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Overview of Legal Status of Post-Adoption
Contact Agreements, in FAMILIES BY LAW 159, 159 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan
Heifetz Hollinger eds., 2004) ("Among the factors contributing to the prevalence
of open adoptions is the rarely noted shift in power from adoptive to birth
parents."); see also Henney et al., supra note 36, at 41 (reporting that during the
time of their longitudinal study of adoption agency practices (1987-1999) "the
most predominant factor leading to change [toward greater openness] was a
response to birthmother demand"); Appell, supra note 29, at 489.
38. Smith, supra note 1, at 19 (reporting that "[pirior to 1973, about one-
fifth of unmarried white women relinquished their infants for adoption" but by
1995 the percentage had declined to 1.7%, and concluding that "[m]any social
shifts help explain the decline of white children placed for adoption over the last
few generations - starting with the growing social acceptance of single,
unmarried parenthood and also including the availability of contraception and
family planning as well as the legalization of abortion"); id. at 16 (discussing
national Survey of Family Growth data evidencing that "the number of
voluntary placements for adoption has declined steadily since 1973" and
providing specific data for never-married woman and never-married white
women placing their infants for adoption in 1973 and 1995); see also Hollinger,
supra note 37, at 159 (noting the "steep decline since the late 1960s in the
number of healthy infants who are voluntarily relinquished for adoption");
Appell, supra note 29, at 486 (attributing the decline in the number of women
relinquishing their newborn children for adoption primarily to "the
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therefore, is able to have a voice in picking the adoptive
parents for her child and, in some jurisdictions, is able to
demand some degree of openness in exchange for her consent
to the adoption. 9
There is a great deal of variation from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction with respect to the enforceability of open adoption
agreements that provide for post-adoption contact between
the birth parents and the adopted child.40 More than twenty
states, however, have enacted statutes that allow courts to
approve and enforce agreements between birth parents and
adoptive parents with respect to post-adoption contact
between the birth parents and the adopted child.4 Where a
statute or case law provides for the enforcement of such
agreements, a typical limitation is that the agreement and
such visitation must be in the best interests of the child. 42
destigmatization of single motherhood and legalization of abortion").
39. See Hollinger, supra note 37, at 159 ('Birth parents, and especially birth
mothers, are not only choosing the individuals who will parent their children,
but often expect to retain a role in the life of the new adoptive family."); see also
Appell, supra note 29, at 486 ('[Blecause the demand for infants so exceeds the
supply, birth parents are able to dictate some of the terms of relinquishment"
including continuing exchange of pictures and letters and even visitation.).
40. See generally 3 ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 26, §§ 13-B.01-
.02 ; see also Hollinger, supra note 37, at 160-61; Appell, supra note 29, at 501-
07, 508-16 (discussing statutes in six states providing for the enforcement of
open adoption agreements and critiquing the various statutory approaches).
Compare Groves v. Clark, 920 P.2d 981, 984 (Mont. 1996) (interpreting
Montana statute, MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-136, "to provide for the recognition
of agreements for post-adoption contact and visitation"), with Birth Mother v.
Adoptive Parents, 59 P.3d 1233, 1235 (Nev. 2002) (unless agreement for post-
adoption contact is contained in the adoption decree, it cannot be enforced by
the court).
41. Hollinger, supra note 37, at 161; see also EvAN B. DONALDSON
ADOPTION INSTITUTE, STATE STATUTES: POST-ADOPTION CONTACT
AGREEMENTS, available at
http://www.adoptioninstitute.orgpolicy/polopen5a.html (providing information
on the statutes of eleven states that have statutorily addressed post-adoption
contact issues comprehensively and on the statutes of nine states that have
statutorily addressed post-adoption contact issues in more limited ways).
42. See Hollinger, supra note 37, at 161 ("The 'best interests of the child'
standard applies to judicial decisions to approve, modify, or enforce post-
adoption contact or visitation agreements.... These statutes generally provide
for a civil action to specifically enforce or modify contact or visitation
agreements until an adoptee's 18th birthday, subject to a 'best interests'
standard."); see also, e.g., Groves, 920 P.2d at 985 ("We conclude that birth
parents and prospective parents are free to contract for post-adoption visitation
and that trial courts must give effect to such contracts when continued
visitation is in the best interests of the child."); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(b)(1)
(West Supp. 2008) ("Nothing in the adoption laws of this state shall be
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Supporters of openness in adoption argue that the open
adoption process in general, and the enforcement of
agreements for post-adoption contact between birth parent
and adopted child in particular, promote the well-being of all
members of the adoption triad.43 In sum,
open adoption is said to enable birth mothers to diminish
their sense of loss, adopted children to possess the piece of
themselves missing from their otherwise secure adoptive
family relationships, and adoptive parents to have access
to information vital to their capacity to respond to their
children's developmental, medical, and emotional needs.44
For the birth parent, continuing contact with the
adopted-out child allows the birth parent to demonstrate to
the child that despite the decision to place the child for
adoption, the birth parent continues to care about the child.45
This may lessen the birth parent's feelings of guilt
surrounding the decision to place the child for adoption.46
construed to prevent [adoptive parents and birth relatives from entering into
certain written post-adoption contact agreements] if the agreement is found by
the court to have been entered into voluntarily and to be in the best interests of
the child at the time the adoption petition is granted.").
43. See generally 3 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 26, § 13.02[3]
(discussing how the interests of the birth parents, adoptive parents, and
adopted child are said to be served by an open adoption); see also Baran &
Pannor, supra note 4, at 119 (discussing findings that "requiring anonymity
between birthparents and adoptive parents and sealing all information about
the birthparents from the adopted child has damaging effects on all three
parties" in the adoption triad). For a discussion of the benefits and risks of open
adoption with contact, see Annette Ruth Appell, Increasing Options to Improve
Permanency: Considerations in Drafting an Adoption with Contact Statute, 18
CHILDREN'S LEGAL RIGHTS J. 24 (1998). Professor Appell lists among the risks
of adoption with contact that (1) difficulties in the relationship between the
birth parent and the adoptive parents "could place the child in an untenable
situation of conflicting loyalty"; (2) some may be disappointed and confused
when a member of the adoption triad does not live up to the expectations of
other members of the triad; (3) continuing contact might be threatening to a
child who is insecure about the permanence of the adoption; (4) postadoption
contact may blur boundaries between members of the adoption triad; and (5) a
static agreement may not be responsive to the evolving needs of the child. Id. at
24.
44. Hollinger, Authenticity and Identity, supra note 30, at 25.
45. See Baran & Pannor, supra note 4, at 119; see also Smith, supra note 1,
at 59-60 ("Birthmothers who have relationships with the children they
relinquished for adoption often report that seeing them and being a resource for
them and their families helps them to affirm the decisions they made and
therefore to feel good about themselves.").
46. See Smith, supra note 1, at 6 ("Several studies reviewed in this report
found those birthparents who have had contact with the adoptive family since
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Such continuing contact also enables the birth parent to
satisfy a curiosity about the child's development and present
circumstances.47
Open adoption can lessen an adoptee's feelings of
rejection by her birthparents. "A realistic understanding of
the problems that led to adoptive placement permits
acceptance of the situation. The continuing link with the
birthparent dispels the notion that the [adoptee was]
abandoned and forgotten."4" Open adoption also allows the
adoptee to know details of her personal history that the
adoptee might otherwise long to know and, thus, avoids
certain adoption-related identity conflicts.49
Finally, open adoption can have psychological and
emotional benefits for the adoptive parents. Through open
adoption, the adoptive parents can have access to more
complete information regarding their child's background,
including facts about the birth family's genetic and health
history.50 The adoptive parents, therefore, can better answer
placement have lower levels of grief, regret and worry, along with more peace
with their decisions, than those who did not have this opportunity."); id. at 49-
50, 55-56 (reviewing studies that conclude that open adoption as opposed to
closed adoption benefits birthmothers in a variety of ways); see also Linda F.
Cushman, Debra Kalmuss, & Pearila Brickner Namerow, Openness in
Adoption: Experiences and Social Psychological Outcomes Among Birth
Mothers, 25 MARRIAGE AND FAM. REV. 7, 13 (1997) (reporting that birthmothers
who had contact with the adoptive family after placement had lower levels of
grief, regret, and worry than those who did not); Baran & Pannor, supra note 4.
47. See Appell, supra note 43, at 24 ("For birth parents, openness permits
them to relinquish their child without losing the ability to learn how their child
is developing, and for some to come to terms with the grief of relinquishment.").
As Susan Livingston Smith explains further:
Living with the uncertainty of what became of their children is
identified by birthmothers in closed adoptions as the most difficult
factor they cope with, and receiving information about their children is
singled out in research and literature examined for this paper as the
most important thing that would help to bring them peace of mind.
Smith, supra note 1, at 6; see also Baran & Pannor, supra note 4, at 122 ("Not to
know whether their children were alive or dead was a continuing source of
sadness for some" birthmothers.).
48. Baran & Pannor, supra note 4, at 122.
49. Id. at 120 (discussing "'identity lacunae,' which can lead to feelings of
shame, embarrassment, and low self-esteem").
50. An adoption need not be open, however, for the adoptive parents to
obtain much of this type of information. See National Council for Adoption,
State Legislation and Mutual Consent Registries, in FAMILIES BY LAW 145, 145
(Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger eds., 2004) ("The argument used that
open records are essential for medical and social history [is] just untrue. This
information can be shared without divulging personal information about the
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the child's questions relating to her personal history and the
circumstances of her adoption.51 Moreover, some researchers
have argued that the adoptive parents' knowledge about the
birth parents can make the adoptive parents more secure in
their role as parents to the child.5"
We should evaluate inheritance laws relating to adoption
and proposed reforms in this area against the purposes and
goals of modern adoption law, including the purposes and
goals of open adoption.53 Writing in 1984, Professor Jan Rein
summarized the rationale grounding the modern approach to
inheritance rights arising from adoption as follows: "The goal
in nonrelative adoption cases is to achieve a complete
severance of the child from his biological family and a total
transplantation of the child into his adoptive family."
5 4
birth parents."). Indeed, every state now provides for the release of non-
identifying background information to adoptive parents and adoptive children.
Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption and Confidentiality, in
FAMILIES BY LAW 123, 124 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger eds.,
2004).
51. See Baran & Pannor, supra note 4, at 120; see also Appell, supra note
43.
52. See Baran & Pannor, supra note 4, at 122-23 ("[Flor adoptive parents,
knowing the birthparents of their children can prevent the fears and fantasies
that might otherwise have a negative effect on their relationships with their
adopted children."); see also Appell, supra note 43, at 24 ("Research suggests
that postadoption contact decreases adoptive parents' anxiety that the birth
parents will attempt to reclaim the child."); Hollinger, supra note 37, at 159
("Openness may even reinforce adoptive parents' sense of entitlement to parent
and enable them to empathize with birth parents.").
53. Rein, supra note 17, at 719 ("We must assess the adequacy of state
provisions for succession by, from, and through an adopted person against the
goals of modern adoption.").
54. Id. In her important article on inheritance rights arising from adoption,
Professor Rein repeatedly distinguished between adoption by "strangers" and
adoptions by a biological relative, arguing that the distinction should give rise
to different rules. See id. at 728 ("While cutting off inheritance ties between the
adoptee and his natural family is usually best, arguably these ties should
remain in the case of some in-family adoptions."); id. at 730 ("In cases in which
natural associations and emotional bonds remain, continuing ties of inheritance
may make sense."); id. at 731 (arguing that where a child is adopted by a blood
relative, the law should preserve inheritance rights vis-&-vis the nonadopting
side of his natural family); id. at 749 (arguing for differential consideration of
extrinsic evidence of testator's intent to include adopted children within a class
gift). I do not read Professor Rein's argument, however, as focusing on the
biological ties between the adopting parent and adopted child. Rather, I read
her argument as focusing on the functional relationship that is likely to
continue to exist between the adopted child and her birth family in cases where
the adopting parent is a biological relative of the adopted child. See id. at 731
(arguing that in cases of adoption by a biological grandparent, "[b]ecause of the
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Professor Rein noted the congruence between this goal and
the 1969 Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which provided that
for purposes of intestacy "an adopted person is the child of an
adopting parent and not of the natural parents."55
What was congruent with dominant theory in 1984
arguably has become incongruent with dominant theory a
quarter century later. The modern approach to inheritance
rights arising from adoption derives from the asserted-
equivalence model. But given the ascendant nature of the
differences model, and in light of the increasing prevalence of
open adoptions, it is worth considering whether inheritance
law might take a different approach to rights arising from
adoption that would better serve all members of the adoption
triad. I turn to that task in Part III.
III. THE "UNCLEING" PRINCIPLE
As the discussion above suggests, a critical task for legal
reform efforts in the adoption context is to structure family
laws and family property laws that support the well-being of
adoptive families, including adopted children, adoptive
parents, and birth parents, by respecting their realities
likelihood that a family relationship between the child and the nonadopting side
of his family will continue, the retention of inheritance ties between the adoptee
and that side of the family seems reasonable"); id. at 749 (arguing that when a
child has been adopted by strangers, the courts should not allow extrinsic
evidence of a testator's intent to include adopted children within a class gift, but
when "the adoptee and his biological relatives continue to know each other
because the adoption occurred within the biological family" a court should
consider allowing such extrinsic evidence). This same factor of a continuing
relationship is critical to inheritance rights arising from an open adoption under
my proposed reform. In cases of open adoption where the birth parent
maintains a qualifying functional relationship with the adopted-out child
subsequent to the adoption, inheritance law should have special rules to
recognize and validate that relationship.
55. See id. at 720 (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109, which provided more
completely that "an adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and not of
the natural parents except that adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural
parent has no effect on the relationship between the child and either natural
parent"). The 1990 UPC contains similar language. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §
2-114:
An adopted individual is the child of his [or her] adopting parent or
parents and not of his [or her] natural parents, but adoption of a child
by the spouse of either natural parent has no effect on (i) the
relationship between the child and that natural parent or (ii) the right
of the child or a descendant of the child to inherit from or though the
other natural parent.
782 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:48
including their differences.56 Such reforms might include
efforts to promote the connections between an adopted child
and her birth family. At the same time, such reforms must
not undermine the role of the adoptive parents as true
parents. My proposed reform, set out below, is sensitive to
this need to balance recognition of the importance of
biological ties with the need to support the adoptive family.
This is an opportune time to be thinking about how
inheritance law might better acknowledge the importance of
biological ties between birth families and adopted children
without undermining the well-being of the adoptive family.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has appointed a Drafting Committee to Amend the
Uniform Probate Code (Drafting Committee). The Drafting
Committee has been working with the Joint Editorial Board
for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts (JEB)58 on considering and
drafting the most extensive changes to the Uniform Probate
Code since Article II of the UPC was thoroughly revised in
56. See Cahn, supra note 3, at 1155 (arguing that "[diifferences inherent in
the new family structure, such as an adoptee having both a birth family and an
adoptive family . . . need to be acknowledged as realities with legal
consequences"); see also Rein, supra note 17, at 722 (arguing that discrimination
against the adopted child in inheritance law undermines the well-being of the
adopted child "by making the adopted child feel like a second-class family
member"); In re Smith's Estate, 326 P.2d 400, 403 (1958) (Crockett, J.,
dissenting) (noting the psychological harm that discriminatory inheritance laws
may cause to an adopted child).
57. Professor Hollinger elucidates the nature of the challenge:
Can our laws be reshaped to ensure that adoptive parents continue to
have full legal status as parents, including the right to decide how, and
with whose advice, to raise their children, while at the same time
accommodating the various kinds of personal, and even legal,
connections that so many adoptees and their adoptive and birth
families apparently want to recognize? Can child welfare policies and
practices acknowledge the role of biogenetic ties in a child's
development without undermining an adoptive family's sense of its own
capacity to shape the child's life and personality?
Hollinger, Authenticity and Identity, supra note 30, at 26.
58. The JEB is a supervisory body charged with monitoring developments
relevant to the UPC. LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 1:23 (4th ed.
2006). The JEB consists of three members from the Uniform Law Commission,
three members from the American Bar Association, and three members from
the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel. It also has an Executive
Director, an Assistant Executive Director, a UPC Reporter, a liaison to probate
judges, and two liaisons to law teachers. Id.
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1990.19 The Drafting Committee has been focusing on several
provisions that concern inheritance rights arising from
adoption as well as provisions that address issues that have
arisen in light of the increasingly common use of assisted
reproduction technologies to assist in the creation of
families.60 This aspect of the larger project61 is in line with
the JEB's long-standing effort to ensure that the UPC
remains responsive to the needs of the evolving American
family.62
For example, proposed section 2-116 would determine the
status of an adopted child for the purposes of intestate
succession.63 This section continues the 1990 UPC's baseline
rule that "[a]n individual is the child of the individual's
adopting parent or parents" 64 and not a child of the
individual's genetic parents.65  The proposed revision,
however, would expand the exceptions under which the
adopted child would be treated as a child of his or her genetic
59. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE (September 2007 Draft Amendments).
Professor Lawrence W. Waggoner, of the University of Michigan Law School, is
the Reporter for the Drafting Committee to Amend the UPC. Id.
60. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-116, 2-118, 2-119. The uncleing principle I propose in
this article with respect to inheritance rights arising from an open adoption
could potentially be applied also to govern inheritance rights of certain
participants in assisted reproduction technologies, such as a gestational
surrogate or an egg donor, and the child born with the aid of such technologies.
The use of assisted reproduction technologies raises policy issues distinct from
those that arise from open adoption. Application of the uncleing principle to the
circumstances of assisted reproduction, therefore, should be separately
considered. Such consideration, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
61. The Drafting Committee is also considering amendments that relate to
such disparate topics as notarized wills, reformation of wills to correct mistakes,
and waiver of the elective share. See id. §§ 2-213, -502, -805.
62. See E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the
Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1094-99 (1999)
(identifying "responsiveness to the changing nature of 'family" as one of the
seven values central to Article II of the 1990 UPC).
63. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE (September 2007 Draft Amendments) § 2-
116(a).
64. See id. § 2-116(c). Draft section 2-116 would replace the 1990 UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b), which presently provides:
An adopted individual is the child of his [or her] adopting parents and
not of his [or her] natural parents, but adoption of a child by the spouse
of either natural parent has no effect on (i) the relationship between
the child and that natural parent or (ii) the right of the child or a
descendant of the child to inherit from or through the other natural
parent.
65. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE (September 2007 Draft Amendments) § 2-
116(d).
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parents. Similar to existing UPC section 2-114, proposed
section 2-116 would provide that
[a]n individual who is adopted by the spouse of either
genetic parent continues to be the child of... that genetic
parent[] and . . . the other genetic parent, but only for
purposes of the right of the child or a descendent of the
child to inherit from or through that other genetic
parent.66
The proposed revision would also treat the adopted child
as the child of both of his or her genetic parents when a
relative (defined as a "grandparent or a descendant of a
grandparent") of a genetic parent or the spouse or surviving
spouse of such a relative adopts the child, "but only for
purposes of the right of the child or a descendant of the child
to inherit from or through either genetic parent."67 Finally,
the proposed revision would also treat the adopted child as
the child of both of his or her genetic parents when the child
is adopted after the death of both genetic parents by someone
other than a relative of a genetic parent or spouse or
surviving spouse of such a relative, "but only for purposes of
the right of the child or a descendant of the child to inherit
through either genetic parent."6
The comments to the proposed UPC section 2-116 do not
elaborate on the rationale or rationales that the drafters
relied upon in drafting these exceptions.69 The exceptions
would seem to apply principally in cases in which the adopted
child is likely to have had an established social relationship
with the genetic family out of which he was adopted and,
66. See id. § 2-116(e).
67. See id. § 2-116(f). Cf. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-4(d)(1) (2007)
(adopted child may inherit from and through natural parent when child is
adopted by a descendant or spouse of a descendant of the child's great
grandparent); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-8 (West 1999) (adopted child may
inherit through biological parent if the adoptive parents are relatives within the
sixth degree of the child). Professor Patricia Roberts proposed such a revision to
UPC section 2-114(b) in 1998. See Roberts, supra note 29, at 568.
68. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE (September 2007 Draft Amendments) § 2-
116(g).
69. This is true as of the September 17, 2007 draft. See id. § 2-116 cmt.
Similarly, the comments to 1990 UPC section 2-114(b), which the draft section
2-116 would replace, do not provide a rationale for the provision that when a
child is adopted by a natural parent's spouse, "the right of the child or a
descendant of the child to inherit from or through the other natural parent" is
not affected. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-114(b).
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moreover, is relatively more likely to have maintained a
relationship with that genetic family after the adoption.7 ° We
might surmise from this that the exceptions are grounded in
the belief that, in the covered family situations, a member of
the genetic family out of which the child was adopted would
continue to think of that child as family and, consequently,
would want the child to inherit from him or her as though the
adoption had not taken place.71
Such a rationale would make the most sense in situations
in which the genetic parent from whom the child is adopted
out had acted as a parent to the adopted-out child prior to the
adoption. Such is likely to have been the case in most of the
family situations covered by each of the three exceptions
contained in proposed section 2-116. Proposed section 2-116,
however, does not require that such a genetic parent ever
have functioned as a parent to the child in order for the
exceptions to apply.
Assuming I have correctly surmised the purpose of the
exceptions contained in proposed section 2-116, the issue
arises whether proposed section 2-116 should incorporate a
functional parent test so that the exceptions would apply only
if the genetic parent had a functional parental relationship
with the child. The Drafting Committee has included such a
test in proposed sections 2-118 and 2-119, which relate to
intestate inheritance rights arising from the birth of a child
born to a gestational mother or conceived by other means of
assisted reproduction technology, and which define
'functioned as a parent of the child' [to] meano behaving
toward the child in a manner consistent with being the
child's parent and performing functions that are
customarily performed by a parent, such as fulfilling
parental responsibilities toward the child, recognizing or
70. See Roberts, supra note 29, at 543 (asserting that the step-parent
exception in 1990 UPC section 2-114(b), which the draft section 2-116 would
replace, "is justified on the theory that a child adopted by a stepparent is more
likely to maintain ties with the non-custodial natural parent and his or her
family than would a child in a traditional, or clear-out, adoption").
71. See Rein, supra note 17, at 730 ("In cases in which natural associations
and emotional bonds remain, continuing ties of inheritance may make sense.");
Roberts, supra note 29, at 553 (arguing that the step-parent exception in 1990
UPC section 2-114(b), which the draft section 2-116 would replace, "helps to
effectuate intent by preserving family ties for inheritance purposes after an
adoption in instances where the adoption often will not, in reality, sever family
ties").
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holding out the child as the individual's child, materially
participating in the child's upbringing, bringing the child
into the individual's household as a regular member of
that household, and assuming custody of the child.7 2
I would not favor use of such a functional parent test in
proposed section 2-116. It would seem likely to be the
relatively rare instance in which proposed section 2-116
would cover the circumstances in which a child is adopted out
and yet the birth parents did not actually ever parent the
child. I am convinced that such exceptional cases would not
merit requiring a showing of actual parenting in all cases
that fall under proposed section 2-116. Rather, as set out
below, I propose a completely new approach to inheritance
rights arising from open adoption that would account for the
likely attenuation of social relationships between the birth
family and the adopted-out child after the open adoption by
moving the adopted-out child and her birth family further
apart on the family tree.
In sum, proposed UPC section 2-116, like the extant
UPC, generally provides that an adopted child should be
treated for inheritance purposes as though he is not a child of
the genetic parent from whom he was adopted out. Proposed
section 2-116 provides, however, like the extant UPC, that in
certain specified circumstances, the adopted child should
inherit from his genetic family as though the adoption had
never taken place. That is, the adopted child is either a full-
fledged child of the genetic family or he is a stranger to the
genetic family.
In this article, I consider how inheritance law might
account for the reality that in some circumstances the
adopted child's relationship with her birth family lies on the
spectrum somewhere between these two extremes. I believe
that typically among these circumstances are those
contemplated by the exceptions to the substitution principle
that are contained in proposed UPC section 2-116. Consider,
72. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE (September 2007 Draft Amendments) §§ 2-
118(b)(2), 2-119(b)(1). Draft section 2-705 ("Class Gifts Construed to Accord
with Intestate Succession; Exceptions") also uses this functional test and
language. The Drafting Committee borrowed the language "functioned as a
parent of the child" from the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 14.8 (2007). Id. § 2-118 cmt. The Reporter's
Note for section 14.8 of the Restatement fleshes out in considerable detail the
test for "functioned as a parent of the child."
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for example, the child who is adopted by the spouse of either
genetic parent. 73 Her genetic parent who is not the spouse of
the adopting parent necessarily must have died, consented to
the termination of her parental rights, or had her parental
rights involuntarily terminated by a court. Even if the
adopting-out parent at one time functioned as a parent to the
child and, therefore, we can assume it likely that that
parent's own extended family came to know the adopted child
as a member of the family, it seems a strong possibility that
the adopted child's relationship with the adopting-out family
will attenuate after the adoption.74
Open adoption presents an even clearer case for
departing from the traditional "all or nothing" approach to
the status of an adopted child vis-A-vis her birth family. The
birth parent who has adopted her child out through an open
adoption does not parent the child. She typically is not a
primary care-giver for the child and she is not financially
responsible for the child. Therefore, an "all" approach-
treating the genetic parent as a parent of the child for
inheritance purposes-would certainly be inappropriate in
such cases. Yet, in cases in which the genetic parent has
maintained a meaningful functional relationship with the
child, a "nothing approach-treating the genetic parent and
the adopted child as strangers to one another for purposes of
inheritance-seems equally inappropriate. This is
particularly so in light of the psychological importance to both
the birth parent and the adopted child of the genetic
73. See id. § 2-116(e).
74. Cf. E. Gary Spitko, Reclaiming the "Creatures of the State": Contracting
for Child Custody Decisionmaking in the Best Interests of the Family, 57 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1139, 1201-04 (2000) (discussing how some of the social norms
and familial bonds that are thought to promote good parenting are likely to
weaken after the parents divorce). The state intervenes to a much greater
degree in the family fractured by divorce than it does in the intact family. Id. at
1201. One of the rationales thought to support this increased level of state
intrusion is the increased likelihood that the non-custodial parent will detach
from the fractured family. Id. at 1203. The non-custodial parent's less frequent
contact with her child, her conflicts with the custodial parent, her lessened
parental authority over the child, and the weakening at the fracture of the
family of social norms encouraging good parenting are all thought to contribute
to this increased likelihood of detachment from the fractured family. Id. My
hypothesis is that similar forces are likely to act on the family "fractured" by the
adopting-out of a child such that the relationships between the adopted-out
child and her birth relatives through the parent who is not the spouse of the
adopting parent will attenuate.
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connection between them (and, in the case of a birth mother,
the gestational connection between them). Thus, an "all or
nothing" approach to inheritance is flawed with respect to
families arising from open adoption when the birth parent
maintains a qualifying functional relationship with the
adopted child.
In this article, I propose implementing in certain
circumstances an "uncleing" principle for inheritance rights
arising from adoption that stands on middle ground between
treating the adopted-out child as a child of her birth parent
and treating the adopted-out child as a stranger to her birth
parent and birth family. To be clear, regardless of whether
the uncleing principle applies to a family situation, the
adopted child would be treated for all inheritance purposes as
a child vis-a-vis the adopting family. But my proposal would
create a new category of family relation that pivots around a
"qualifying birth parent." The qualifying birth parent and the
adopted child would stand in relation to each other as family
members, but not as parent and child, for inheritance
purposes. Rather, the two would stand in relation to each
other as aunt/uncle and nephew/niece.
A. Inheritance From a Birth Parent or Adopted-Out Child
Pursuant to my proposed uncleing principle, the
qualifying birth parent would be treated for inheritance
purposes as an aunt or an uncle of the adopted child. Thus,
the qualifying birth parent would inherit from the adopted
child's intestate estate only if the adopted child died without
any surviving spouse, living descendant, parent, sibling, or
grandparent. In such a case, the qualifying birth parent
would share in the intestate child's estate along with the
intestate child's other aunts and uncles (or their
representatives) by adoption.
Similarly, the adopted child would take in intestacy from
the qualifying birth parent as a niece or a nephew. Thus, the
adopted child would take only if the birth parent died without
being survived by any spouse, legally-recognized living
descendant, parent, or sibling.75 In such a case, the adopted
75. Cf COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-103(6) (West 1997) (providing that an
adopted child shall inherit from her biological parent if the parent left no other
heir).
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child would share in the qualifying birth parent's estate along
with the birth parent's other nieces and nephews or their
representatives.
My proposal, in a narrow sense, is consistent with the
current UPC and the September 2007 draft amendments to
the UPC. My proposal is fully consistent with the UPC's
baseline rule that "[a]n individual is the child of the
individual's adopting parent or parents" and not a child of the
individual's genetic parents. 6 My proposal would not alter
who is a parent for inheritance purposes. It would allow an
adopted child to inherit from and through her birth parent,
not as a child of the birth parent, but rather as a niece or
nephew of the birth parent.
The uncleing principle generally, however, is at odds with
the UPC's exceptions to the baseline rule to the extent that
those exceptions recognize a birth parent who has not
actually parented the adopted child as a parent of the child
for some inheritance purposes. In those circumstances, the
reasoning grounding the uncleing principle would suggest
that the birth parent should not be treated as a legal parent
to the adopted child for any inheritance purposes. As noted
above,7 in the run of cases in which the exceptions would
apply, it is likely that the birth parent who has died or has
had her parental rights with respect to the child voluntarily
or involuntarily terminated did at one time parent the child.
Even in these circumstances, however, the rationale of the
uncleing principle would suggest that, for inheritance
purposes, the birth parent should be considered a relative of
the adopted child, but not a parent of the adopted child.
Because of the mutual detachment of the birth family from
the adopted child and vice versa likely to follow termination
of the birth parent's parental rights,78 the adopted child and
the adopting-out birth family should inherit from and
through each other only as more distant relations as
contrasted with the inheritance rights arising generally from
a legal parent-child relationship. Thus, the uncleing principle
recognizes that in certain circumstances following an open
adoption, meaningful social connections continue to exist
76. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE (September 2007 Draft Amendments) § 2-
116(d).
77. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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between an adopted-out child and her birth family but those
connections typically become more attenuated than they
would have had the adoption not taken place. In light of this
attenuation, therefore, the uncleing principle increases the
distance on the family tree between the adopted-out child and
her birth family.
B. Inheritance Through a Birth Parent or Adopted-Out Child
One might apply the uncleing principle to allow a birth
parent and her adopted-out child to inherit from each other
but not through each other. Thus, under a "from-but-not-
through" approach, if the birth parent were to predecease her
own mother, the adopted-out child would not inherit as an
heir from her birth grandmother at the grandmother's death
and, similarly, the birth grandmother would not inherit as an
heir from the adopted-out child at the adopted-out child's
death. A rationale in support of such an approach would be
that even if the predeceasing birth mother and the adopted-
out child had maintained a qualifying functional relationship,
we might expect that the relationship between the adopted
child and more distant birth relatives would be attenuated to
such a degree that it should not give rise to inheritance
rights. Similarly, where the adopted-out child predeceases
her birth parent, we might expect that the relationship
between the birth parent and any living descendant of the
predeceasing adopted-out child would not be of such a quality
that it should give rise to inheritance rights between the birth
parent and the living descendant of the predeceasing
adopted-out child.79
I believe, however, that the better approach would be to
apply the uncleing principle to allow the birth parent and the
adopted-out child to inherit through each other as well as
from each other.80 The uncleing principle can adequately
respond to the likely attenuation of functional relationships
79. I would think that the idea of a birth parent inheriting through the
adopted-out child from the child's adoptive relatives or vice-versa should be a
complete non-starter, and my proposal would not provide for such inheritance
rights.
80. I would also favor allowing more distant biological relatives to inherit
through the birth parent from the adopted-out child, and allowing the living
descendants of the adopted out child to inherit through the adopted-out child
from the birth family.
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between birth relatives and an adopted-out child (and living
descendants of that adopted-out child) by increasing the
distance between such relatives on the family tree. In sum,
the uncleing principle can be used to increase by one "line of
inheritance" and by two "degrees of kinship" the distance on
the family tree between any birth relative and the adopted-
out child or any living descendant of the adopted-out child.
To fully understand this, we first need to understand how
to calculate "lines of inheritance" and "degrees of kinship." A
"line" (also known as a parentela) refers to an individual's
ancestor of a certain distance up the family tree from the
individual and descendants of that ancestor, excluding
persons who occupy a lower line."1 For example, to calculate
an individual's "first line" relatives, one would go up the
family tree one generation to the individual's parents and
then include all descendants of those parents excluding the
individual and descendants of the individual. To calculate an
individual's "second line" relatives, one would go up the
family tree two generations to the individual's grandparents
and then include all descendants of those grandparents
excluding persons in the first line and excluding the
individual and descendants of the individual.8 2
To calculate the "degree of kinship" between person A
and person B, one would count generations up person A's
family tree until one gets to person B or an ancestor that
person A and person B have in common. Where one has first
encountered a common ancestor going up the family tree (as
opposed to where one has first encountered person B going up
the family tree), one would then count generations down the
family tree until one arrives at person B.13 For example, to
81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.3 cmt. a (1998); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78.
"Parentela" and "line" have the same meaning, except that we begin numbering
parentelas at the decedent and descendants of the decedent, while we being
numbering lines at the parents of the decedent and descendants of those
parents. Thus, any given parentela is the same as the line numbered one
higher. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.3 cmt. a (1998); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at
78.
82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.3 cmt. a (1998); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78-80.
83. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.4 cmt. k (1998); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at
80.
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calculate the degree of kinship between sibling A and sibling
B, one would count from sibling A up one generation to the
parent that sibling A and sibling B have in common. One
would then count down from that parent one generation to
sibling B. One plus one equals two. Thus, siblings are
related in the second degree.14 To calculate the degree of
kinship between nephew A and uncle B, one would count from
nephew A up two generations to the grandparent of A/parent
of B that nephew A and uncle B have in common. One would
then count down from that grandparent/parent one
generation to uncle B. Two plus one equals three. Thus, a
nephew and uncle are related in the third degree."5
We can apply the uncleing principle not only to the
relationship between a birth parent and the adopted-out
child, but also to the relationship between any birth relative
and the adopted-out child or living descendant of the adopted-
out child. For simplicity's sake, however, consider first
application of the uncleing principle to the relationship
between the adopted-out child and her birth parent. As I
have set out above, the uncleing principle transforms the
adopted-out child's birth mother into her aunt for purposes of
inheritance. This is another way of saying that the uncleing
principle adds one line of inheritance and two degrees of
kinship between the adopted-out child and her birth mother.
At the child's birth, the mother is a first-line relation of the
child. The mother is also related to the child in the first-
degree." (Quite simply, we need count up only one
generation from the child to arrive at the mother.) By
treating the birth mother as an aunt of the child, the uncleing
principle transforms the birth mother into a second-line
collateral relative."' This is because an individual's aunt is a
descendant of that individual's grandparent (but not of that
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.4 cmt. k (1998); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at
79.
85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.4 cmt. k (1998); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at
79.
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.4 cmt. j (1998).
87. An individual's "collateral" relatives include any person who is related to
the individual by blood but who is not an ancestor or a descendant of the
individual. Id. § 2.4 cmt. a; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78.
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individual's parent), and the grandparent is two generations
up the family tree from the individual. Moreover, by treating
the mother as an aunt, the uncleing principle transforms the
mother into a third-degree relation. This is because a niece
would count up two generations on her family tree to arrive
at her grandparent -the first ancestor in common between
the niece and the aunt- and then count down one generation
from the grandparent to the aunt. Adding two (generations
up from the individual to her grandparent) and one
(generation down from the grandparent to the aunt) gives us
three as the degree of kinship between an individual and her
aunt. Thus, the uncleing principle treats a birth mother as a
second-line, third-degree relation of the adopted-out child.
We can apply the same uncleing principle to any other
combination of birth relative and adopted-out child. For any
given relation, we simply add one line of inheritance and two
degrees of kinship to the line of inheritance and degree of
kinship otherwise existing based on biology. Thus, for
example, the uncleing principle would transform an adopted-
out child's birth aunt into her first cousin once removed
standing in the third line."8 As discussed immediately above,
at the child's birth, her aunt is a second-line, third-degree
relation. By adding one line of inheritance and two degrees of
kinship to this relationship, the uncleing principle transforms
the aunt into a third-line, fifth-degree relation. Such a
relative is a first cousin once removed standing in the third
line of inheritance (the grandchild of an individual's great-
grandparent).8 9 Generally, such a relative would not inherit
as an heir from the adopted-out child if the adopted-out child
died survived by any spouse, living descendant, parent, or
first-line collateral relative.9" In addition, in many
jurisdictions, such a relative also would not inherit as an heir
from the adopted-out child if the adopted-out child died
88. An individual's first cousin once removed might stand in the second line
of inheritance (the great-grandchild of the individual's grandparent) or in the
third line of inheritance (the grandchild of the individual's great-grandparent).
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 79. In contrast, for example, a first
cousin is always in the second line of inheritance. Id.
89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.4 cmt. k (1998); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 79.
90. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS §§ 2.3(a), 2.4(a) (1998); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78.
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survived by any second-line relative. 91  Even if the
jurisdiction switched from a line-of-inheritance intestacy
scheme to a degree-of-kinship intestacy scheme when no
spouse, living descendant, parent, or first-line collateral
relative survived the decedent, such a relative would inherit
as an heir from the adopted-out child only if the adopted-out
child also had no surviving second, third, or fourth-degree
relation.92
Finally, consider the adopted-out child as she stands in
relation to her birth aunt. At birth, the child is a first-line,
third-degree relation to her aunt.93 The uncleing principle
91. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.4(a) (1998) ("If an intestate decedent leaves no surviving spouse
and no surviving descendant, nearly all intestacy statutes grant the intestate
estate to the second parentela [the first line] (the decedent's surviving parents
or, if deceased, to the parent's surviving descendants) and if no member of the
second parentela survives the decedent, to the third parentela [the second line]
(the decedent's grandparents or, if deceased, to the grandparent's surviving
descendants)."); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 80.
92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.4 cmt. j (1998) ("Under the 'nearest kindred' part of the statute,
the relatives in the lowest degree of kinship, being the decedent's nearest living
relatives, share the estate equally."); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11,
at 78-80. All American intestacy statutes utilize a line-of-inheritance approach
to determine heirs through the first line of inheritance. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.4 cmt. c (1998) ("The
decedent's parents and their descendants inherit to the exclusion of more
remote ancestors and their descendants."); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra
note 11, at 78. In general, if the decedent is survived by a descendant, no
ancestors or collateral relatives will take as heirs. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.3(a) (1998); see also
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78. If the decedent left no surviving
descendant, any intestate property not passing to the surviving spouse would
pass to the decedent's parents or first-line collateral relatives by representation.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.4
cmt. c (1998); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78. If the decedent
left no surviving descendant, no surviving spouse, no parent, and no first-line
collateral relative, in most jurisdictions the intestacy scheme would continue on
utilizing a line of inheritance approach (seeking to pass the intestate property to
any grandparents or second-line collateral relatives by representation).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.4
cmt. h (1998); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 80. Other
jurisdictions would switch to a degree-of-kinship system (seeking to pass the
intestate property to the blood relative with the lowest degree-of-kinship
number with respect to the decedent). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.4 cmt. j (1998); see also DUKEMINIER ET
AL., supra note 11, at 80.
93. At the same time, as discussed above, the aunt is a second-line, third-
degree relation to her niece. While two relatives necessarily share the same
degree of kinship with respect to one another, they do not necessarily stand in
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would add one line of inheritance and two degrees of relation
between the adopted-out child and her birth aunt to
transform the adopted-out child into a second-line, fifth-
degree relation of the aunt. Thus, the adopted-out child
would take through her predeceasing birth parent from her
birth aunt, if at all, as a first cousin once removed standing in
the second line (as a great-grandchild of the birth aunt's
grandparent) .
C. Qualification for the Uncleing Principle
My proposed reform would apply the uncleing principle to
give rise to inheritance rights arising from an open adoption
only when one of two circumstances exist. The first
circumstance is when the birth parent and the adoptive
parents include in the adoption decree their agreement that
the uncleing principle shall apply to alter the intestacy
scheme. The second circumstance exists when the birth
parent has maintained a "qualifying functional relationship"
with the adopted-out child. Thus, I advocate both a
registration and a functional (multi-factor) approach for
determining inheritance rights under the uncleing principle.
Both means for qualification derive from the rationales
and goals of the uncleing principle. I briefly review those
goals and rationales, therefore, before turning to a discussion
of the details of each means for qualification. The first goal of
the uncleing principle is to better promote donative intent
than does the presently dominant "all or nothing" approach to
inheritance rights arising from adoption. The principal
the same line of inheritance with respect to one another. With respect to an
aunt and her niece, for example, the niece is a descendant of the aunt's parent
and, therefore, a first line collateral relative of the aunt. The aunt, however, is
not a descendant of the niece's parent and, therefore, is not a first-line collateral
relative of the niece. Rather, the aunt is a descendant of the niece's
grandparent and, therefore, is a second-line collateral relative of the niece.
94. Finally, one might extend my proposed reform so that the default rule
for interpreting donative instruments, such as a will or a trust, would be in
accord with the uncleing principle. Thus, for example, in accordance with the
uncleing principle, the adopted-out child would presumptively share in a class
gift to "my nieces and nephews" created in the will or trust of the adopted-out
child's birth mother. I would not favor such an extension of the uncleing theory.
It is not likely that a testator or settlor would use the words "nieces and
nephews" to mean "nieces, nephews, and adopted-out child." A default rule that
would interpret "nieces and nephews" to mean "nieces, nephews, and adopted-
out child," therefore, would not seem well-suited to the promotion of donative
intent.
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assumption that grounds the uncleing principle is that when
a birth parent and the adopted-out child have maintained a
functional relationship, they are likely to view each other as
family, but not as functional parent and child. The uncleing
principle, therefore, treats the adopted-out child and birth
family as potential heirs of each other but increases the
distance between them on the family tree by one line of
inheritance and two degrees of relation.
The second goal of the uncleing principle is to support the
well-being of all members of the adoption triad in cases of an
open adoption where the birth parent has continued to have a
relationship with the adopted-out child subsequent to the
adoption. My reform supports the adoptive parents in their
role as parents by recognizing the primacy of the care-taking
family. For this reason, the uncleing principle does not in any
manner or for any purpose treat a birth parent who has
adopted her child out as the adopted-out child's parent. But
at the same time, the uncleing principle recognizes and
validates the psychological and emotional bonds that often
develop between an adopted-out child and her birth parent
and birth family. The uncleing principle implicitly teaches
that biological ties are most meaningful when there exists a
functional familial relationship as well. By recognizing and
validating the biological and functional relationship between
a birth parent and her adopted-out child, the uncleing
principle seeks to lessen the feelings of loss, regret, and
shame that a birth parent may have concerning the
placement of her child for adoption.95 Thus, my proposed
reform supports a mindset that encourages the birth parents
to stay involved in the adopted-out child's life throughout that
child's life, even if they will not play the role of parent to that
child.
With these goals and rationales in mind, I turn now to a
discussion of my proposed means for qualifying for
inheritance rights under the uncleing principle. First, a birth
parent and the adopting parents should be able to opt into the
uncleing principle expressly at the time the court enters a
final adoption decree. That is, the open adoption agreement
95. But cf. Rein, supra note 17, at 730 ("The preservation of the child's
relationship with a parent who has voluntarily relinquished the child for
adoption or abandoned him in some manner seems wrong.").
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and the adoption decree should be able to change the
intestate inheritance rights otherwise arising from the open
adoption.96 When the birth parent and the adoptive parents
so agree and the court includes the agreement in the adoption
decree, the uncleing principle would apply to maintain a legal
relationship between the birth family and the adopted-out
child.97 The uncleing principle would increase the distance on
the family tree between the adopted-out child and any birth
relative by one line of inheritance and two degrees of relation.
It is worth emphasizing that the uncleing principle would
not allow the birth parents and adoptive parents the freedom
to alter the intestacy scheme in just any way they would like.
Rather, the uncleing principle would allow the parties to opt
into a fixed alternate scheme that would treat the birth
parent as an aunt or uncle to the adopted-out child and would
similarly increase the distance on the family tree between the
adopted-out child and other members of the birth family.
Most importantly, and because the law should not treat one
96. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.130(a)(1) (2006) (adoption decree
"terminate[s] all legal relationships between the adopted person and the natural
parents and other relatives of the adopted person, so that the adopted person
thereafter is a stranger to the former relatives for all purposes including
inheritance, unless the decree of adoption specifically provides for continuation
of inheritance rights"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(1) (1998)
(adoption decree can preserve adoptee's inheritance rights from her birth
family); Cahn, supra note 3, at 1131-32 (discussing the 1873 Nebraska adoption
statute, NEB. REV. STAT. § 797 (1873) and the 1873 North Carolina adoption
statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 3 (1873), which allowed the birth parents and
adopting parents to set out in the adoption petition the adoptee's inheritance
rights).
97. A court will bless the open adoption agreement in the adoption decree.
Unlike a will, therefore, the modification to the intestacy scheme arising from
the open adoption agreement generally will not be revocable (except, in a sense,
by will) and generally will not be subject to challenge. Although an adoption
can be challenged after the final adoption decree, many states have a short
statute of limitations for bringing such a challenge, typically six months to three
years. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9102(a) (West 2004) ("An action or
proceeding of any kind to vacate, set aside, or otherwise nullify an order of
adoption on any ground, except fraud, shall be commenced within one year after
entry of the order."); id. at (b) ("An action or proceeding of any kind to vacate,
set aside or nullify an order of adoption, based on fraud, shall be commenced
within three years after entry of the order."); see generally 3 ADOPTION LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 26, § 8.01[3] (discussing time limits for bringing an action
challenging an adoption and noting that "many states have enacted statutes
providing that a final decree of adoption may not be attacked - neither directly
nor collaterally, and for no jurisdictional or procedural error - after the running
of a defined period of limitations (usually not in excess of three to five years)").
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who has not parented as a parent, the parties would not be
allowed to agree that the law would treat the birth parents as
legal parents for inheritance purposes.
When the adoptive parents and birth parents did not opt
into the uncleing principle at the time of the adoption decree,
my proposed reform would look to the quality of the
relationship between the birth parent and the adopted-out
child following the open adoption to determine if the birth
parent maintained a "qualifying functional relationship" with
the child. The functional test would not focus on whether
the birth parent ever functioned as a parent of the child.99
Rather than asking whether the birth parent fulfilled
parental responsibilities, exercised parental authority, or
generally behaved as a parent with respect to the child, the
inquiry would focus on whether the birth parent provided
emotional support to the child during their mutual lives. In
short, the inquiry is not whether the birth parent "parented"
the adopted-out child, but rather the inquiry is whether the
birth parent "uncled" the adopted-out child.100 Just as an
aunt or uncle might have an emotionally supportive
relationship with a niece or nephew without any right to the
care, custody, or control of the child, a birth parent might
enjoy a "qualifying functional relationship" with the adopted-
out child despite her lacking any custody rights or parental
authority with respect to the child.
Among the factors that I would think would be highly
relevant to the central inquiry of whether the birth parent
"uncled" the adopted-out child would be the duration and
98. Cf. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2108 (West 2005) (allowing an adopted
child to inherit from her birth relatives other than her birth parents when those
birth relatives have maintained a relationship with the adopted child).
99. Cf UNIF. PROBATE CODE (September 2007 Draft Amendments) § 2-
118(b)(2):
"Functioned as a parent of the child" means behaving toward the child
in a manner consistent with being the child's parent and performing
functions that are customarily performed by a parent, such as fulfilling
parental responsibilities toward the child, recognizing or holding out
the child as the individual's child, materially participating in the child's
upbringing, bringing the child into the individual's household as a
regular member of that household, and assuming custody of the child.
100. A birth parent who performed any of the parental functions set out in
draft section 2-118 after adopting out her child likely would meet the lesser
standard for maintaining a "qualifying functional relationship" set out in my
proposed reform. Only in that sense might the inquiry as to whether the birth
parent parented the child be relevant.
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constancy of the functional relationship between the birth
parent and the adopted-out child; whether the birth parent
regularly visited the adopted-out child; whether the birth
parent regularly communicated with the adopted-out child
via telephone calls, letters, emails, cards, etc.; whether the
birth parent shared in or otherwise acknowledged major life
events of the adopted-out child such as birthdays, major
holidays, religious milestones, graduations, and the child's
wedding; and whether the birth parent provided for the
adopted-out child by means of will substitutes. °1 Neither the
presence nor the absence of any one of these factors alone
should be dispositive. Rather, the court should consider the
totality of the circumstances.
10 2
I would think, however, that the duration and constancy
of the relationship should be given the greatest weight in
most cases. Typically, only where the birth parent has
provided life-long emotional support for the adopted-out
child-where the birth parent has never abandoned the
child-should the relationship merit recognition that would
give rise to intestate inheritance rights. Thus, for example,
where a birth parent had maintained a meaningful
relationship with the adopted-out child during the child's
minority but had little contact with the child for many years
prior to the death of the first of them to die, the relationship
101. Naming the adopted-out child as a will substitute beneficiary might be
an indication that the decedent would prefer that the adopted-out child inherit
as her heir. Cf. Mary Louise Fellows, Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Amy
Chiericozzi, Ann Hale, Christopher Lee, Robin Preble & Michael Voran,
Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1,
59-62 (1998) (reporting a positive relationship between a respondent having
named her committed partner as her life insurance beneficiary and the
respondent's preference for having a hypothetical committed partner inherit a
larger portion of a hypothetical probate estate).
102. Nevertheless, a statute might employ a rebuttable presumption that
"uncleing" has occurred following an open adoption in cases in which there was
an open adoption agreement that called for a meaningful social relationship
between the birth parent and the adopted-out child and in which a minimum
number of specified circumstances (e.g., the birth parent regularly visited with
the adopted child) also existed. Cf. LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY
PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS AND FUTURE
INTERESTS 108-09 (3d ed. 2002) (Professor Waggoner's "Working Draft" proposal
to reform intestacy law to include intestate inheritance rights for unmarried
committed partners by means of a multi-factor approach, which proposal
employs a rebuttable presumption that the relationship at issue was "marriage-
like" if the decedent and the claimant engaged in one or more of four specified
behaviors).
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generally should not be found to constitute a "qualifying
functional relationship." °3 Likewise, where a birth parent
failed to maintain a meaningful relationship with the
adopted-out child during the child's minority, the relationship
generally should not be found to constitute a "qualifying
functional relationship," regardless of whether the birth
parent and the adopted-out child began a meaningful
relationship during the child's adulthood.
0 4
While the introduction of uncertainty into the probate
process should always be a concern whenever one is
contemplating increased judicial discretion and the utilization
of a multi-factor test, 0 5 the uncleing principle has a relatively
high objective hurdle that should lessen fears about
uncertainty: The multi-factor inquiry can be relevant only in
cases of a birth parent who adopted-out her child by means of
an open adoption and maintained some regular relationship
with the child. Moreover, as discussed above, the uncleing
principle would apply to pass intestate property, at its most
inclusive, only when the decedent left no living descendant,
no surviving spouse, no parent, and no sibling. This too
should lessen concerns about any opening of the floodgates for
vexatious litigation.
103. But cf Estate of Griswold, 79 Cal. App. 4th 1380 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000),
abrogated by In re Griswold, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638 (2000) (holding that a
biological father's admission of his paternity in a "bastardy" proceeding during
the out-of-wedlock child's infancy was a sufficient acknowledgement of
parentage for purposes of California's inheritance statute; the biological father
had paid court-ordered support for the child until the child was eighteen years
old, but never met or communicated with the child, and had no involvement in
the child's life after the child turned eighteen and until the biological father
died thirty-four years later).
104. Cf. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West Supp. 2008) (treating a foster parent
or stepparent as a parent of foster child or step child for certain purposes of
intestate succession where, inter alia, "[tihe relationship began during the
[childi's minority and continued throughout the joint lifetimes of the [child] and
the [child]'s foster parent or stepparent").
105. See, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate
Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 OREGON L. REV. 255,
284-89 (2002). This article discusses the importance of administrative
convenience in designing an intestacy provision, commenting:
It is a principal challenge for succession law in this era of the
emergence of the legal movement to recognize functional family to
balance a concern with certainty and ease of administration with the
desire for succession law to better serve the needs of property owners
who have formed less dominant family structures.
Id. at 286-87.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This article proposes an uncleirng principle to determine
intestate inheritance rights in cases of open adoption in
which a birth parent has maintained a "qualifying functional
relationship" with the adopted-out child subsequent to the
adoption. When applicable, the uncleing principle would
treat the adopted-out child and her birth parent as potential
heirs of one another. Unlike the presently dominant "all-or-
nothing" approach to inheritance rights arising from
adoption, however, my proposal would not under any
circumstances treat the birth parent as a legal parent of the
adopted-out child for purposes of inheritance. Rather, the
uncleing principle would treat the birth parent as an uncle or
aunt to the adopted-out child, and would similarly increase
the distance on the family tree between the adopted-out child
and members of her birth family by one line of inheritance
and two degrees of kinship.
When applicable, the uncleing principle would better
serve the interests of the adopted child, her adoptive family,
and her birth family than does the all-or-nothing approach,
under which the adopted-out child is either a child of her
birth parents for purposes of inheritance or is a stranger to
her birth parents for purposes of inheritance. The uncleing
principle affirms the parental role of the adoptive parents by
refusing to treat a birth parent as a legal parent.
Simultaneously, the uncleing principle recognizes and
validates the importance of the bond between the adopted
child and her birth family when the birth parent has
maintained a sufficient functional relationship with the
adopted child subsequent to the adoption.
The uncleing principle differs significantly from the
proposed UPC section 2-116 presently under consideration by
the Drafting Committee to Amend the Uniform Probate Code.
Most significantly, proposed UPC section 2-116 continues the
all-or-nothing approach to intestate inheritance rights arising
from adoption. In other ways, however, my uncleing principle
is in sync with some of the Drafting Committee's more
innovative September 2007 draft amendments to the Uniform
Probate Code.
First, the September 2007 draft amendments
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demonstrate a marginally increased openness to recognition
of relationships based on function as opposed to status. °6
Specifically, the proposed amendments utilize a functional
test in several provisions to determine whether an individual
functioned as a parent of a child for the purposes of
determining intestate inheritance rights or construing class
gifts. 10 7 The September 2007 draft amendments' "functioned
as a parent of the child" test is similar in kind to my proposed
functional test for determining whether a birth parent
maintained a "qualifying functional relationship" with the
adopted-out child.
Second, the September 2007 draft amendments
demonstrate an increased willingness to recognize non-
traditional heirs when such heirs would not displace more
traditional heirs. Specifically, proposed section 2-103 would
recognize as an heir the descendant of the intestate
decedent's predeceasing spouse where the decedent left "no
surviving spouse, descendant, parent, descendant of a parent,
grandparent, or descendant of a grandparent."08 Similarly,
my proposed uncleing principle would create new heirs only
as a near last resort. My principle would give rise to
inheritance rights that would displace only distant heirs or
the state as "heir" by escheat.
This feature of the uncleing principle--displacement of
only distant heirs-should lessen resistance to the functional
component of my proposal-use of a functional test to
determine intestate inheritance rights. By definition, the
106. The 1990 UPC considers function only in a negative sense in providing
that "[iinheritance from or through a child by either natural parent or his [or
her] kindred is precluded unless that natural parent has openly treated the
child as his [or hers], and has not refused to support the child." UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-114(c) (1998).
107. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE (September 2007 Draft Amendments) §§ 2-
118, 2-119, 2-705.
108. Id. § 2-103. More fully, draft section 2-103 provides: "If there is no
surviving spouse, descendant, parent, descendant of a parent, grandparent, or
descendant of a grandparent, [but] there is one deceased spouse who has one or
more descendants who survive the intestate decedent, the intestate estate
passes by representation to those descendants." Id. § 2-103(5)(A). "If there are
more than one deceased spouses who have one or more descendants who survive
the intestate decedent, the intestate estate is divided into as many equal shares
as there are such deceased spouses, each share passing by representation to
those descendants." Id. § 2-103(5)(B). "The term deceased spouse refers to an
individual to whom the intestate was married at the spouse's death." Id. § 2-
103 cmt.
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uncleing principle would not operate in cases in which the
intestate decedent is survived by a spouse, living descendant,
parent, or sibling. Experimentation with the use of a
functional approach would seem to be preferable in such
circumstances, as contrasted with use of a functional
approach to displace a spouse, living descendant, parent, or
sibling as heir.
In short, the fear of getting the functional test wrong
should be less in cases in which only more distant heirs are
consequently supplanted. This is so for three reasons relating
to donative intent, reliance, and reciprocity. 0 9  First,
displacing more distant heirs is less likely in the run of cases
to contravene the donative intent of the decedent as
contrasted with displacing more closely-related heirs. 110
Second, distant heirs are less likely to have been economically
dependent on the decedent as contrasted with more closely-
related heirs."' And finally, distant heirs are less likely to
have contributed to the decedent's accumulation of wealth
and are less likely to have provided for the decedent's well-
being as contrasted with more closely-related heirs." 2
My proposed uncleing principle, therefore, provides an
attractive means for inheritance law practitioners and
109. See, e.g., Spitko, supra note 105, at 269 (identifying the promotion of
donative intent, reciprocity, reliance, and ease of administration as the four
values that should ground an intestacy scheme).
110. See Mary Louise Fellows, E. Gary Spitko & Charles Q. Strohm, An
Empirical Study of Will Substitutes: Should Intestacy Statutes Take Will
Substitutes into Account? (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(reporting on the authors' empirical study in which survey respondents
distributed more of a hypothetical probate estate to a will substitute beneficiary
who was a second-degree relation of the decedent than to a will substitute
beneficiary who was a third-degree relation of the decedent, and distributed
more of a hypothetical probate estate to a will substitute beneficiary who was a
third-degree relation of the decedent than to a will substitute beneficiary who
was a fourth-degree relation of the decedent).
111. See Ralph Calhoun Brashier, Half-Bloods, Inheritance and Family, 37
U. MEM. L. REV. 215, 236 (2007) ("The policy concerns underlying statutes for
half-blood relatives differ substantially from those underlying provisions for
members of the family the decedent created" in that half-blood relatives are less
likely to have become dependent on the decedent for their support and are less
likely to have contributed to the decedent's acquisition of wealth.); see also
Thomas E. Atkinson, Succession Among Collaterals, 20 IOwA L. REV. 185, 187
(1935) (identifying "provision for dependents of the decedent" (as well as
promotion of donative intent) as one of "two primary considerations" that should
ground an intestacy statute).
112. See Brashier, supra note 111, at 236.
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scholars to become habituated to the idea of introducing
function and the concomitant increased judicial discretion
into the probate process. If the functional component of my
proposal were to prove workable, one might expect that such
success would help pave the way for further inheritance law
reforms utilizing functional tests which might displace less
distant heirs such as the decedent's children, parents, and
siblings in favor of the decedent's functional family.'13
113. See, e.g., Spitko, supra note 105 (considering how one might best
structure a multi-factor approach intestacy scheme that might grant intestate
inheritance rights to a surviving committed partner).
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